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ABSTRACT
Despite Russia’s increasing clout and assertiveness in its region, Turkey
has chosen to improve its relations with Russia, rather than balance
against it through its Western allies. Turkey’s unexpected strategic
partnership with Russia is best seen as an example of bandwagoning
for proﬁt. It is an assertivebandwagoningwith theobjectiveof counter-
ing Kurdish separatism, an imminent problem in the Turkish ruling
elite’s ranking of threat perceptions. The empowerment of Syrian
Kurdish groups under the protection of the United States has moved
Turkey closer to Russia. A long-term alliance between the two, how-
ever, depends on reconciliation of their diﬀerences which are deeply
rooted in historical and geo-political factors.
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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan describes his relationship with his Russian
counterpart, Vladimir Putin, as one that is “really special”. Turkey has completed its
negotiations with Russia to obtain the S-400 missile system, and a Russian consor-
tium will build a nuclear power plant on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey in a deal
that does not involve the transfer of technology or ownership. These are signiﬁcant
military and energy initiatives of enormous strategic magnitude. Yet, just a few years
ago, in November 2015, a Russian SU-24 ﬁghter aircraft ﬂying over the Turkish-
Syrian border was shot down by a Turkish F-16 warplane, an event that Putin
described at that time as “a stab in the back by the accomplices of terrorists”.
Thus, the recent deal is an interesting reversal of the relationship. Not only has
Turkey normalised its relations with Russia, but Russia has also become Turkey’s
closest partner in the region. Given that Russia historically occupied the central seat
in Turkish security calculations and was perceived as a major threat against which
Turkey sought to balance through alliances with Western powers, this recent move is
a puzzle that begs explanation.
Turkey’s strategic bandwagoning with Russia is best explained by structural factors
related to both domestic and international politics. At the centre of this explanation lies
Turkey’s changing security environment in which Kurdish separatism has returned as
the most pressing security threat in the perception of Turkish leaders and in the context
of the resurgence of nationalism and securitisation in Turkish domestic politics.
Moreover, Turkey feels itself under increased pressure in terms of its security as
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a result of the prolonged nature of the conﬂict in Syria. Since 2016, Turkey has changed
its goal in Syria from regime change, which it adopted at the beginning of the Arab
Spring, to one of preventing a probable Kurdish autonomous zone.
We argue that the Kurdish question and the increasing diﬀerences that Turkey has
with its key allies on this issue is the most signiﬁcant reason why Turkey has been re-
adjusting its relations with Russia. However, we also think that this is not a sustainable
position for Turkish foreign policy as its entire historical formation has left a legacy in
which Turkish and Russian interests diverge. Turkey and Russia have very diﬀerent
interests and objectives stemming from diﬀerent structural constraints and opposing
historically rooted regional alliances in a vast geography stretching from the Balkans to
Central Asia. Retuning Turkish foreign policy to its new relationship with Russia will
have important repercussions in all these areas of Turkish foreign policy.
The article starts with a discussion of alliance theory in an attempt to locate our
question within an appropriate theoretical framework. This is followed by a discussion
of Turkey’s grand strategy of historical balancing against Russia through alliances with
Western powers as implemented during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War meant
the removal of Turkey’s historical threat, yet it also meant the resurfacing of its old
ethnic and religious identity questions, with resulting opportunities and threats. Then
came the Arab Spring, one of the most signiﬁcant turning points in the recent history of
the Middle East, completely altering the strategic parameters of the region for both
regional and international powers. We discuss the ramiﬁcations of the failure of this
process for Turkey and the resulting security environment in the context of the Syrian
conﬂict as the principal factor informing Turkish foreign policy towards the United
States and Russia. In this context, we tackle the question of how the emergence of the
Kurdish threat in the region as well as other important security threats in Turkey’s
domestic politics distance Turkey from the United States and move it closer to Russia.
We conclude with thoughts on the future prospects, that is the feasibility and sustain-
ability of this reorientation.
Alliance theory: balancing vs bandwagoning
Despite expectations that Turkey would be alarmed by Russia’s increasing assertiveness
in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean region, Turkey has moved closer to Russia,
in contrast to its grand strategy of balancing against it. Here, structural realist theories
can shed some light on the matter. In his classical conception of the “balance of power”,
Kenneth Waltz (1979, 118) asserts that states maximise their possibility of survival
when no neighbouring country is strong enough to dominate any other, in other words,
when their power is balanced. Stephen Walt (1985, 12-3) revised this theory arguing
that states do not develop a sense of insecurity simply on account of power capabilities.
Rather, states act according to perceived threats. This emphasis on perceptions opens
up room for a realist-constructivist synthesis.
Waltz’ balance of power and Walt’s balance of threat theories are both on alliance
formation. They argue that, when under threat (material or perceived), states will
usually balance against it. However, Walt’s conceptualisation of what constitutes
a threat resonates with constructivist thinking in the sphere of international relations
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theories. According to Walt (1985, 12-3), one of the factors that shapes a state’s threat
perceptions is another actor’s “oﬀensive intention”.
At the same time, interests, identities and threat perceptions are all constructed and
ever changing as a result of social interactions among actors (Ruggie 2005). In other
words, Walt integrates elements of a socially constructed world as found in constructivist
theory into structural realism. Some other theorists, such as Brown et al. (2000), criticise
Walt on this, claiming that his approach is logically inconsistent whilst diminishing
realism with its use of perceptions and other elements usually found in constructivist
thinking. Barkin (2003), instead, argues in favour of realist-constructivist compatibility,
calling for the creation of a new theoretical approach called “realist constructivism”.
In line with this, we believe that a modiﬁed balance of threat theory provides a good
theoretical framework for explaining Turkey’s perceptions of a Kurdish threat in Syria.
The way in which Turkey develops its threat perceptions is linked to historical factors
that go back to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the way the Turkish
national identity was constructed.
Yet, although the balance of threat theory can help understand Turkey’s recent
international behaviour to some extent, it does not explain everything. Walt’s theory
falls into the realm of defensive realism and argues that under most circumstances,
states will balance rather than bandwagon against threats. Even if they do bandwagon,
Walt claims that states do so for defensive reasons as they join the side that is most
threatening. As will be explained in the following sections, Russia has historically been
one of Turkey’s most serious security threats. Hence, Walt’s theory cannot explain the
whole picture behind Turkey’s perceived bandwagoning behaviour, in that the theory
assumes that states will take on a defensive posture whereas we hold that Turkey’s
bandwagoning has been guided by oﬀensive considerations.
In order to see the full picture, realist theories must be brought in that can explain
Turkey’s oﬀensive posturing towards Syrian Kurdish groups, most speciﬁcally the
Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD). Even though Walt’s theory
includes elements that are not commonly found in realism, it has nevertheless been
criticised for its omission of domestic variables and idiosyncrasies that could account
for bandwagoning behaviour (Kaufman 1992; Barnett and Levy 1991). Randall
Schweller (1994) conﬁrms the existence of such variables and argues for a diﬀerent
sort of alliance behaviour.
Deﬁned by some as a neoclassical realist, Schweller creates a typology of states based
on their internal dynamics to predict their alliance behaviours. In line with this, he
argues that Walt’s theory was skewed in favour of balancing due to its faulty equaliza-
tion of bandwagoning with capitulation (Schweller 1994, 79). Although he acknowl-
edges that states can bandwagon for security and defence as Walt understood it,
Schweller introduces another reason: states can be cajoled and co-opted into joining
the stronger side, not out of fear, but out of interest or “proﬁt”, as he calls it. This would
explain Turkey’s bandwagoning with Russia in order to position itself oﬀensively
against the Syrian Kurds and push back their claims of autonomy and independence.
In other words, Turkey wants safer borders as well as greater political and strategic
inﬂuence in northern Syria, and this has driven it to consider allying with Russia.
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Turkey’s grand strategy: balancing against Russia
Analysed from a structural perspective, strong geostrategic and historical factors that
shaped both Turkey’s and Russia’s foreign policies (Dugin 2015; Isakova 2005) would
make them incompatible as long-term allies. Structural clashes with Russia deﬁned the
foreign policy of the Ottoman state during the last few centuries of both empires’
existence. As explained by Gökhan Çetinsaya (2017, 5), the most important concern for
Ottoman and Turkish statesmen was the regional challenge posed by Russia.
During the 18th and 19th centuries, the Ottoman Empire lost all of its major wars
against Russia, signiﬁcantly reducing Ottoman inﬂuence over the remainder of its
Balkan territories. Yet, Russian expansion brought the British and the French to back
the empire, providing military and ﬁnancial assistance. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire’s
admission into the European family of nations in the 18th century was dictated to
a large extent by the threat coming from Russia (Hale 2013, 2-3). Even though the
Ottomans’ attempt to modernise with the ﬁnancial and military assistance provided by
France and Britain created a situation of dependency on Europe and thus ultimately
failed, this strategy prolonged the life of the empire, setting the stage for the Turkish
grand strategy that would continue for many decades afterward. Moreover, this feeling
of insecurity with respect to Russia shaped the foreign policy of the modern Turkish
Republic for much of its history (Millman 2006, 488).
A major source of anxiety for both Ottoman and Turkish leaders has always been
Russia’s desire to control the Straits in order to gain unobstructed passage into the
Mediterranean Sea (Ahmad 2004, 9). The question of the Straits came up after
the Second World War when Soviet leader Joseph Stalin wanted common Russo-
Turkish control of them (9). Stalin also demanded the return of the two Turkish cities
of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia – demands which
Turkey categorically rejected. Even today, access to warm waters continues to play an
important part in Russian geopolitical thinking (Delman 2015). Besides providing
a faster route to the Atlantic Ocean through the Mediterranean Sea, it would also
allow Russia to impose its presence increasingly on Southern and Central Europe.
In order to counter the increasingly assertive Soviet Union following the Second World
War, Turkey sought closer relations with the West, of which Turkey’s membership in
NATO in 1952 was the most signiﬁcant step towards institutionalisation of this policy
(Aydin 1999, 168). In the ColdWar alliance system, Turkey served as NATO’s easternmost
member, bordering directly on the Soviet Union. This position gave Turkey enormous
geostrategic importance in US and European security calculations. For example, in 1959, 15
nuclear warhead-carrying Jupiter missiles were deployed on Turkish soil as a ﬁrst line of
defence against the Soviet Union (Kosebalaban 2011b, 75). Throughout the Cold War,
Turkey ﬁrmly anchored itself in the Western security alliance system. This did not
necessarily mean complete synchronization of Turkish and Western foreign policies.
Particularly with respect to the Cyprus issue, Turkish foreign policy deviated from the
policy of its Western allies, particularly the United States. Furthermore, Turkey also sought
a signiﬁcant economic relationship with the Soviet Union, especially in the late 1960s.
Nevertheless, Turkish foreign policy during the ColdWar followed the grand strategy of the
Ottoman Empire which was to seek balance against Russia.
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Making sense of post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy
The end of the Cold War fundamentally altered this security context for Turkey,
leading to the emergence of alternative and often conﬂicting responses in its domestic
politics. It set free Turkey’s long-suppressed identity issues and brought into question
its isolationist mentality.
One of the most dominant identity conﬂicts Turkey experienced was with its Kurdish
minority. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the founder of modern Turkey,
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, sought to model the new nation on a form of Turkish nationalism
based on common cultural and religious ties. All non-Turkish Muslim minorities were
forced to assimilate into the Turkish national identity (Zurcher 2004). Such nation
building quickly generated reactions, which culminated in a series of Kurdish revolts,
most notable of which were the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, the Mt. Ararat rebellion in
1930 and an Alevi sectarian revolt in Dersim in 1937. Even though the Turkish state
quickly dealt with these uprisings through military means, they left an important imprint
on Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms. Furthermore, the role of the military in addressing
these revolts left a lasting legacy in Turkish politics (Olson 2000).
The next series of conﬂicts came in 1980s with the appearance of the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK). Formed in 1978, the PKK adopted
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideology in its quest for Kurdish independence from the
Turkish state (Criss 2008). In 1984, the PKK took up arms, which prompted Turkey to
declare it a terrorist organisation, marking the beginning of a conﬂict that has con-
tinued, on and oﬀ, until the present (Radu 2018).
Despite the dominance of hardline policies owing to the inﬂuence of the Turkish
military as a political actor, there were attempts aimed at ﬁnding a peaceful solution to
the crisis. Most speciﬁcally, Turgut Özal, Turkish President from 1989 to 1993,
attempted to resolve it through economic and political reforms. Following Özal’s
death, however, the Turkish military emerged once more as the most powerful actor
in politics, toughening its response to a resurgent PKK.
In the foreign policy realm, Turkey was ﬁghting a war against an alleged alliance
between Greece, Syria and the Syria-based PKK, which it sought to balance by forging
a counter alliance with Israel (Elekdağ 1994). This militarily-imposed foreign policy
perspective conﬂicted with the liberal heritage of Özal, who saw Turkey’s future in
European integration and democratisation. It also came up against the pro-Islamic
perspective of the Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan, who formed a coalition
government following his party’s electoral victory in the 1995 general elections.
However, this government never enjoyed the full support of Turkey’s strong Kemalist
establishment. The military pressured Erbakan into signing several military cooperation
deals with Israel, and eventually forced him to submit his resignation, no longer fully
satisﬁed with his compliance.
The period that lasted from the 1990s to the early 2000s was dubbed a ‘lost decade’ as
it was characterised by highly unstable coalition governments and a stagnant economy.
The massive 1994 economic crisis and chronic government ineﬃciency coupled with
the appearance of fresh faces on the domestic political scene eventually led to the
collapse of the shaky coalition governments. A younger generation of Islamist politi-
cians led by Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan challenged the leadership of the
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old guard in the 2002 elections. They adopted liberal economic principles and a foreign
policy perspective that was pro-EU membership and globalist in outlook.
The coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma
Partisi, AKP) in 2002 was one of the most signiﬁcant turning points in modern Turkish
history. Campaigning on a liberal conservative platform, the AKP obtained
a parliamentary majority and brought stability, free from coalitional bickering. The
AKP era can be seen as consisting of three periods, each with distinct orientations in
Turkish foreign policy.
In the ﬁrst phase, which lasted from 2002 to 2011, Turkey continued its traditional
foreign policy orientation, in which relations with the West were prioritised and
membership of the EU was the main focus. Turkey saw this as the best way to solve
its long-lasting domestic problems. With the appointment of Ahmet Davutoğlu as
Foreign Minister in 2009, Turkey focused on playing the role of a central power
pursuing economic integration with its Middle East neighbours, particularly Syria,
and acting as a mediator in solving conﬂicts in the region. This policy came to be
known as ‘zero problems towards neighbours’ (Davutoglu 2010). At the same time,
Turkey’s activism in the Middle East did not contradict its ambition to join the
European Union, despite some obvious tensions in the relationship with major EU
member countries, particularly Germany and France (Brand 2010). In line with the EU
membership process, important reform and democratisation packages were passed in
parliament, the most signiﬁcant of which involved improving the cultural rights of
ethnic minorities. This period was marked by a notable improvement in relations with
its Kurdish minority.
The Turkish government decided to end hostilities with Kurdish armed movements
through what was dubbed the “Kurdish opening” in the summer of 2009 which aimed
to integrate Kurdish elements into an overarching democratic initiative in favour of
national unity (Candar 2009). This came as the culmination of the integrationist
tendencies the AKP government had been pursuing since its early days in power.
Even as far back as 2005 Erdogan claimed that the Kurdish question did not pertain
only to Kurdish segments of the population but to the entire nation and required a
democratic and legal solution (Sabah 2009).
In the second phase, while moving towards economic integration with neigh-
bouring countries, particularly Syria, Turkey was confronted with the Arab upris-
ings. The Arab Spring (2011-16) shook the foundations of the regional order in the
Middle East. Turkey was caught unprepared for this event and faced a major
dilemma as to whether it should side with the authoritarian regimes based on its
zero-problems approach or whether it should support the popular uprisings. After
a brief period of confusion during the Libyan crisis, the conclusion was reached
that it would be in Turkey’s best interests for the region to move towards some
kind of electoral democracy at the expense of the dictatorships. As Kemal Kirişçi
(2011) maintains, the United States, the West, and the Arab popular movements
hailed Turkey as a ‘model’ country for the Middle East and fully supported its role
as an exporter of these values. Turkey promoted its image as a Muslim electoral
democracy in order to bring about change in the region and support governments
that would be more sympathetic to its role as a central regional power. Such
a transformation would pave the way for the coming to power of moderate
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Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria, and
would also undermine Turkey’s regional hegemonic rivals, most notably Iran and
Saudi Arabia, as well as Israel.
In the meantime, the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations can be explained by both
domestic and structural variables. Both the AKP’s conservative and liberal democratic
orientations clashed with Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. Turkey voiced support for the
Palestinian question in high-level diplomatic occasions such as the 2009 Davos summit when
Erdogan walked away from a panel event which included Israeli President Shimon Peres. In
2010, a Turkish humanitarian ﬂotilla was raided by the Israeli navy on its way to Gaza,
causing the death of nine Turkish citizens. Furthermore, Turkey’s new role as a model
country for Arab states prevented it from achieving any closer political rapprochement
with Israel (Oguzlu 2010).
At the same time, conﬂicts with the Kurds arose again in the domestic arena as early as
2010. Several ceaseﬁres had been made over the years, most notably in 2010 and 2013. Yet,
massive Kurdish nationalist protests erupted all over Turkey in reaction to the siege in 2014 of
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on Kobane, a Kurdish majority town in Syria, as
Kurds blamed Turkey for turning a blind eye to the ISIS attacks. Despite such tensions,
Turkey coordinated an operation with the PYD to transfer the tomb of Suleyman Shah, the
founder of the Ottoman dynasty, from an ISIS-controlled area to the PYD-controlled part of
Syria. Until 2016, diplomatic contacts between Turkey and the PYD continued.
The third period started in 2016. Its main characteristics are the prioritisation of
security issues, with an unprecedented nationalist rhetoric uncharacteristic of a AKP
government. In this period, the AKP government has abandoned its own synthesis of
economic liberalism and social conservatism, replacing it with a new synthesis of con-
servatism and nationalism. Simultaneously, in the domestic sphere the Kurdish resolu-
tion process has been halted while in the foreign policy arena Turkey initiated operation
‘Euphrates Shield’ intended to expunge ISIS militants from the Syrian town of Jarablus
and thereby stop further territorial gains of the PYD allied with the PKK (Ozertem 2017).
Hence this third period is a complete reversal of the ﬁrst two periods, which shared
a focus on the basic principles of democratic values.
Until 2016, Turkey maintained its basic orientation in line with the grand strategy
established in the period immediately after the formation of the Republic through its
alliance with the United States and the West. It also utilised its position under the
Western umbrella to extend its standing in the Middle East. However, from 2016
onwards, Turkey began to restructure its orientation. In this third stage, Turkey has
acted on its own in security dealings, as its objectives have clashed with those of the
United States, most signiﬁcantly with regard to the Kurdish forces in Syria. Such
a dramatic strategic distancing has forced Turkey to move closer to Russia in a way
that is unprecedented in Turkish history.
The Syrian conﬂict and Turkey’s altered security concerns
Turkey understood the challenges presented by the Arab Spring but also saw it as an
opportunity to expand its sphere of inﬂuence in the region. In other words, Turkish
promotion of democracy in the region was not empty idealism that Turkey would
pursue at any cost, but rather an instrumental and pragmatic strategy reﬂecting its
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conservative democratic norms and values (Kosebalaban 2011a). Yet this strategy went
wrong during implementation.
Turkey’s ambitious attempt to reshape the regional order traditionally based on
authoritarian regimes caused a conﬂict with other regional powers, most notably
Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia perceived the main threats to its security as
coming from Iran, as Iran backed regional Shia movements and moderate Islamist
movements poised to beneﬁt from the downfall of the regional dictators (Al-Rasheed
2013). At the same time, Saudi Arabia supported the uprising in Syria in order to
remove Assad with whom Iran historically had good relations. From the Turkish
standpoint, the regime change in Iraq in 2003 coupled with the emergence of
Hezbollah’s dominance in Lebanon created a massive Iranian sphere of inﬂuence that
extended all the way to the Mediterranean Sea. Yet unlike Saudi Arabia, Turkey did not
see Iran as an existential threat and even cooperated with it in certain areas where their
interests aligned (Ayoob 2014). Hence, all three regional powers had competing and
conﬂicting visions of the nature of that order and this clash of interests created
a situation in which Turkey was unable to coordinate its regional policies with major
regional powers.
Furthermore, the very nature of the tug-of-war, particularly over Syria, further
destabilised the region, paving the way for the emergence of rival factions with ties to
diﬀerent regional and international actors. In the case of Turkey, the rising power of the
PKK-aﬃliated Kurdish PYD coupled with the growing threat of ISIS presented a major
challenge. The intensiﬁcation of terror attacks by both the PKK and ISIS in major cities
in Turkey in 2016 resulted in the dissolution of the Kurdish peace process.
In Syria, this was an even more serious issue for Turkey due to the links between the
PYD and the PKK. Since the very beginning of the crisis in 2015, Turkey emphasized
the close connection between the Turkish PKK and Syrian PYD, going so far as to see
the PYD as a Syrian oﬀshoot of the PKK (Reuters 2018). In the same vein, Turkish
Chief of General Staﬀ Hulusi Akar proclaimed that Turkey would not support the
arming of Kurdish terrorists under the pretext of their being ‘operational partners’
against the Islamic State (Kardaş 2018; Özpek 2017). It is clear that Turkish policy
towards Syrian Kurds was inﬂuenced by its re-emergent security concerns towards any
semblance of Kurdish independence claims. The declaration of independence by the
Iraqi Kurdish government in 2017 was protested most strongly by Turkey, reversing the
warm relationship in which Turkey had heavily invested after 2010.
Bandwagoning with Russia came as a consequence of the collapse of the liberal
orientation that the ruling AKP had followed until 2016 in both domestic and inter-
national politics, as well as the divergence in strategic priorities with the United States
regarding the role of Kurdish groups in Syria. Whereas Turkey began perceiving the
Kurds as its main threat after 2016, the United States was more concerned with Bashar
Assad and the threat emanating from jihadist groups like ISIS, and actually came to see
the Kurdish forces as natural allies against ISIS, an interpretation that Turkey rejected.
Furthermore, Turkey was increasingly unable to coordinate its involvement in the
Syrian conﬂict with the United States due to the unwillingness of the Obama admin-
istration to project US power in Syria.
Another signiﬁcant factor in the Turkish disillusionment with the West was its
reaction to the military coup in Egypt. While the United States had supported gradual
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and peaceful democratic transition during peacetime, it quickly backed away from this
stance and returned to its traditional policy of supporting authoritarianism. Erdoğan
slammed the coupmakers as “enemies of democracy” and chastised the Western powers
who backed it (Benari 2013). Turkey came to note bitterly the duplicity of Western
foreign policy towards the Middle East and feared that it could be isolated in the future.
Turkey could no longer count on Western powers since they went against Turkey’s
attempt to reshape the region on the model of an electoral democracy. Because of the
structural constraints in the region and its own lack of material capabilities, Turkey’s
attempt to empower democratic elements in the region failed.
Strategic distancing from the United States and rapprochement with Russia
Turkish-Russian relations cannot be analysed without looking at the tension between
Turkey and the United States. Since the Iraq War of 2003, when the Turkish parliament
refused to allow US troops to pass through its territory, US-Turkish strategic relations
had suﬀered periods of tension. The election of Barack Obama as US President greatly
contributed to improving relations on a personal level as Obama named Erdoğan
among the leaders with whom he was able to forge “bonds of trust” (Hürriyet Daily
News 2012). The two leaders’ positions on Arab democratisation were also similar as
reﬂected in Obama’s Cairo speech of 2009 (Obama 2009).
Yet, major diﬀerences soon resurfaced, particularly in the context of the later stages
of the Syrian war when the Obama administration refused to put “American boots on
the ground”, despite the expansion of ISIS-controlled territory in Syria and Iraq and the
intensiﬁcation of ISIS terror attacks in Europe (Zenko 2015). Instead, the United States
relied on air bombings of ISIS targets and sent special operations units that worked
closely with the Kurdish groups against ISIS (Baker et al. 2015). The US military
operations did not directly target Syrian government forces even when the Assad
government crossed Obama’s red line on chemical attacks in 2013. François
Hollande, then French president, stated that this was “a missed opportunity that
could have changed the course of the war” (France 24 2018).
This hesitant stance of the Obama administration paved the way for greater Iranian
and Russian military involvement in support of the Assad regime. In contrast to the US
position, Syria had greater strategic signiﬁcance for Russia. Not only is Russia’s only
naval base in the Mediterranean located in the port town of Tartus but, during the Arab
Spring, Syria presented a bulwark against the tidal wave of democratisation and radical
Islam that was threatening Russia and the regimes on its border. Since 2011, Russia had
been barring all Security Council resolutions pertaining to military intervention and
coordinated removal of Syrian President Bashar Assad. Russian policy towards Syria
reﬂects the changing nature of the post-Cold War international system whereby
regional powers are more sceptical towards the idea of military interventions, especially
those guided by the principles and wishes of the United States and the European Union
(Charap 2013).
After 2011, Russia found a likely regional ally in another revisionist power, Iran
(Mead 2014). For various reasons, both of these countries are wary of Western regional
designs, especially towards Syria (Charap 2013). They also share a long-term friendship
with the current regime that can be traced back to the time of Haﬁz al-Assad, Bashar’s
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father. The interests of Russia and Iran converge in Syria, which both see as an area of
the utmost geopolitical and strategic signiﬁcance, hence their commitment of resources
to protect the Assad government. During the Syrian crisis, the most pressing issue for
Turkey became embodied in the Syrian Kurds. The PKK and its proximity to the Syrian
government as well as to Kurds inhabiting northern parts of Syria had always been
Turkey’s top security preoccupation since the formation of the party in the late 1970s
(Nimet 1997). After the Syrian conﬂict started in 2011, Syrian Kurds organised them-
selves into military factions, the most notable of which were the People’s Protection
Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG), an armed branch of the PYD, which pursues
greater autonomy for Kurds in Syria and is aﬃliated to the PKK (Gruber 2015).
Nevertheless, until the 2015 cancellation of the Kurdish peace process in Turkey,
Turkey did not confront the PYD, even hosting its leader Salih Muslim in Ankara
and Istanbul several times (Özer 2014). An undisclosed Turkish oﬃcial made the
following remark: “It is possible to reconcile with the PYD. There is a huge diﬀerence
between the ISIS and the PYD. We believe that the PYD is a rational actor that we can
take as an interlocutor” (Selvi 2015). In 2016, however, the intensiﬁcation of PKK terror
attacks coupled with the military coup attempt in July of the same year, dramatically
altered Turkey’s security calculations, and led to the formation of an Islamist-nationalist
coalition – after which Turkey perceived the empowerment of Syrian Kurdish groups as
an immediate security threat.
Therefore, after 2016, Assad’s downfall became a secondary concern for Turkey, as it
aimed, rather, to gain ground in Syria to roll back the Kurdish groups (Larrabee 2016).
The problem was that the United States had close relations with them, and Turkish
options were constrained in terms of relative material capabilities (Thornton 2015). The
Russia-Iran axis continued to focus on the survival of Assad, while the Western bloc led
by the United States perceived ISIS and similar jihadist groups as the main security
threat. In connection to this, US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated that the
Kurds are the most motivated force on the ground against ISIS (Rosen 2015). For
Americans, this became clear during the Kurdish defence of Kobane against the
onslaught of ISIS forces.
US support for the PYD, while Turkey was doing everything in its power to prevent
aid from reaching the Kurdish forces, created a distance between the two NATO allies.
The Obama administration’s hesitation to put American military on the ground in Syria
and its gradual abandonment of support to the armed Arab opposition forced Turkey
to carry the weight of supporting the moderate groups in cooperation with Saudi Arabia
and Qatar. However, this task overburdened Turkey and growing diﬀerences with Saudi
Arabia resulted in a lack of coordination.
The election of US President Donald Trump in November 2016 created a mood of
optimism in circles close to the Turkish government, but this soon gave way to major
disappointments. The Trump administration not only did not budge on the two
problematic areas of the relationship, namely the extradition of Fethullah Gülen and
US military support for the PYD, it also opened new ground for confrontations.
Trump had declared his willingness to open a new chapter in US-Russian relations
amidst accusations by US intelligence agencies that Russia had meddled in the 2016 US
presidential elections (Yourish and Griggs 2018). If tension with Russia was not
diminished before a possible US-Russian rapprochement under Trump, Turkey feared
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it could face severe repercussions in its regional politics, most importantly the future
shaping of the Syrian political map. Moreover, a new crisis erupted with the Trump
administration in 2016 on the issue of the arrest in Turkey of Andrew Brunson, accused
of assisting the Gülen network and the PKK. Washington imposed several signiﬁcant
political and economic sanctions on Turkey, prompting a severe currency crisis (BBC
2018). Disagreements with the US are neatly summed up in a following statement by
Erdogan in 2018:
The United States has repeatedly and consistently failed to understand and respect the
Turkish people’s concerns. And in recent years, our partnership has been tested by
disagreements. Unfortunately, our eﬀorts to reverse this dangerous trend proved futile.
Unless the United States starts respecting Turkey’s sovereignty and proves that it under-
stands the dangers that our nation faces, our partnership could be in jeopardy . . . .
Washington’s failure to grasp the seriousness of our concerns regarding national security
threats emanating from Northern Syria resulted in two military incursions that cut oﬀ the
so-called Islamic State’s access to NATO’s borders and removed the YPG militants from
the city of Afrin. As in those cases, we will take necessary steps to protect our national
interests (Erdoğan 2018).
Due to this tension in Syria with its major ally, Turkey became increasingly isolated and
exhausted its resources amidst a massive inﬂux of Syrian refugees ﬂeeing to Turkey.1
Consequently, Turkey was unable to follow through on the principles of regional
democratisation and regime change upon which its foreign policy had rested. The
United States and its Western allies abandoned Turkey in favour of their own realpo-
litik calculations. At the same time, due to the involvement of Iran and Russia, Turkey
did not have suﬃcient material capabilities to change its security position. This is where
we believe that the balance of threat theory comes in. It provides an additional variable
to power relations in explaining state behaviour: threat perceptions. For centuries, the
country that Turkey perceived to have the greatest oﬀensive intentions towards it was
Russia. Yet, in the post-2016 context, the Russian threat was perceived by the Turkish
security establishment to be of secondary importance. The spoils of war that Turkey
was ultimately aiming for was removal of the Kurdish military presence from northern
Syria. This desire manifested itself in the 2018 Turkish siege on the Kurdish Syrian city
of Afrin, as mentioned by Erdogan, which is within the Russian-dominated sphere of
Syria. Russia’s acquiescence in Turkey’s military operation signiﬁed a divergence from
its previous stance whereby it barred any unilateral Turkish action on Syrian territory
via its control of the Syrian airspace. Thus, Turkey aligned itself with Russia in order to
achieve an oﬀensive position vis-à-vis the Syrian Kurds.
This marks a return to a more resolute and determined foreign policy toward
neighbouring countries (Dalay 2016). Under the conditions in which the United
States ﬁrmly backed the PYD and Saudi Arabia regarded the fall of Assad as its ultimate
objective, the only way Turkey could achieve its main security priority was through
strategic cooperation with Russia. Turkey’s perception of Kurdish autonomy in its
neighbouring countries as a threat explains its bandwagoning with Russia in order to
prevent the Kurds from consolidating power in northern Syria is ﬁrmly tied to the
historical construction of Turkish nationalism. Domestic variables also account for
1The total number of Syrian refugees eventually reached 3.5 million by 2018 (McKernan 2018).
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Turkey’s relations with Russia with the historical construction of their respective
domestic identities explaining their precarious relationship and threat perceptions
(Torbakov 2017). When these factors are taken into consideration, Turkey’s band-
wagoning with Russia for proﬁt can be understood.
Concluding remarks
This article has explored why Turkey has chosen to move closer to Russia in signiﬁcant
strategic issues, despite Russia’s increased power in the regions encircling Turkey. The
question presents a puzzle as it contradicts Turkey’s grand strategy of the last two
centuries, whereby the Ottoman Empire and Turkey confronted an assertive Russia by
seeking alliances with Western powers. We have responded to this question using
factors at the domestic and regional levels, in the framework of a modiﬁed realist
theory of alliances.
We believe that the sudden empowerment of the PKK-linked Kurdish groups in
Syria as a consequence of the Syrian conﬂict provoked Turkey’s nationalist sensitivities
built on memories of territorial disintegration, commonly referred to as the Sevres
syndrome. Turkey’s threat perceptions regarding the Kurdish issue, as well as its
oﬀensive posturing in favour of countering it overcame those of a Russian threat.
Given that the United States, Turkey’s security ally under NATO, is the principal
power protecting and supporting the Kurdish groups in Syria, the very groups that
Turkey considers linked to the PKK, Turkey has had to move closer to Russia to obtain
permission to conduct what it sees as necessary ground operations. We believe that this
amounts to bandwagoning, which means going with the threat rather than against it.
However, the strategic goal of Turkey’s bandwagoning with Russia is balancing against
the threat of Kurdish separatism.
In this article, we focused on political variables and structural changes in Turkey’s
regional and domestic security environments, more speciﬁcally, the empowerment of
the PKK-linked Kurdish groups during the Syrian conﬂict. We believe that this threat
for Turkey cannot be understood merely as an external issue as it is linked with
Turkey’s domestic politics. Thus, in this sense we believe that the black box of the
state needs to be opened up. For Turkey, close cooperation with Russia was necessitated
by the Turkish state’s perception of the emerging Kurdish separatist threat as a greater
and more imminent threat than the one posed by Russia. Turkey turned towards Russia
in the context of closer US cooperation with the PYD.
Yet what remains to be answered is why the ruling elite in Turkey which initiated the
most comprehensive democratisation reforms and a peace process with the Kurdish
nationalists, returned to the Turkish state’s old sensitivities and reﬂexes. It is quite
ironic that the Justice and Development Party’s leadership, who steered the country’s
foreign policy decisively in a liberal direction to obtain full membership in the EU and
embarked upon the improbable process of democratisation in the entire Middle East,
has embraced nationalist discourse once again and a return to securitisation of foreign
policy.
For a complete answer to this puzzle, we had to bring the issue to the level of Turkish
domestic politics, exploring the events that took place in the last few years and
analysing changing political alliances. This further convinced us of the need to adopt
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an eclectic analysis that bridges not only the domestic and international levels, but also
realism and constructivism. We believe that Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia is
strategic and assertive, designed to counter the Kurdish threat, rather than merely
a passive reaction to powerlessness. At the same time, because of its proﬁt-oriented
nature, it is highly unlikely that Turkey’s position represents a permanent repositioning
away from its historical Western alliance and towards a new, more sustainable strategic
alliance with Russia.
Our prediction is that Turkey’s deep security concerns regarding Russia will remain
and may cause another shift if Turkey can ﬁnd a stable alternative source of power to
balance against the resurgence of Kurdish separatism. A strategic alliance between
Turkey and Russia fundamentally contradicts the historically-rooted culture of insecur-
ity and the geopolitically-rooted interests of both countries in a number of regions
extending from the Balkans to the Middle East, from the Black Sea region to Central
Asia. The most fundamental diﬀerence between the two is their overall vision regarding
the future shape of the regional order in the Middle East.
Even though Turkey’s strategic priorities have shifted from democracy promotion in
the Middle East to prevention of Kurdish autonomy or independence in Iraq and Syria,
which for some observers amounts to normalisation and for others to a paradigm shift
in Turkish foreign policy, this positioning itself depends on the composition of the
ruling elites in domestic politics. At the same time, despite their own authoritarian
tendencies, the current ruling elites in Turkey still appear to subscribe to a view that
their interests are best served if the existing political order in the Middle East, centred
on authoritarian regimes, is transformed into one based on elected conservative gov-
ernments that protect their existing political boundaries. This is evident in their ties
with opposition movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and their tensions with
major autocracies in the region including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Russia, however,
remains ﬁrmly committed to the status quo in which dictatorial regimes dominate and
has demonstrated its commitment by forging strategic ties not only with Syria, but also
with post-coup Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, on the very issue
of Kurdish separatism, Russia’s position is the farthest removed from that of Turkey, as
Russia does not recognise the PKK as a terrorist organisation and maintains ties with
both the PKK and the PYD.
Finally, the future of Turkish-Russian relations fundamentally depends on the future
of Turkish-American relations. If the roadblocks that caused the tension in US-Turkey
relations can be removed, then Turkey’s reliance on Russia will not be so strong.
Trump’s surprise decision to pull all US troops out of Syria, if implemented, will
potentially have major eﬀects on both Turkish-Russian and Turkish-American rela-
tions. Yet Turkey’s strategic rationale for bandwagoning with Russia with the goal of
preventing any future Kurdish independence in Syria is likely to survive the American
withdrawal.
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